Fordham Law Review
Volume 89

Issue 5

Article 12

2021

Reframing Article I, Section 8
Richard Primus
Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law School.

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Primus, Reframing Article I, Section 8, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 2003 (2021).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol89/iss5/12

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

REFRAMING ARTICLE I, SECTION 8
Richard Primus*
[T]he true objective of the American Constitution was not to limit but to
create more power.
—Hannah Arendt, On Revolution1

INTRODUCTION
As a purely textual matter, the original Constitution’s2 enumeration of
congressional powers could be read as a limiting list (“Congress may exercise
these powers and no others”) or as a nonlimiting list (“Congress may exercise
these powers and maybe also others”). Either way, the cumulative scope of
the powers that Congress may exercise could leave Congress with less
legislative jurisdiction than it would have with a general police power, or it
might turn out that the powers Congress enjoys are sufficient to authorize
Congress to enact pretty much any legislation that it deems to be in the public
interest3—subject, of course, to affirmative prohibitions like those in the Bill

* Theodore J. St. Antoine Collegiate Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law
School. This Essay was written for the Symposium entitled The Federalist Constitution,
hosted by the Fordham Law Review on October 2, 2020, “at” Fordham University School of
Law. I thank the organizers of and participants in this Symposium for their contributions.
Thanks also to the participants in a faculty workshop at Penn State Law. Special thanks to
Mary Sarah Bilder, Ruby Emberling, Cheri Fidh, Rick Hills, Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Rob
Lothman, David Schwartz, and, as always, Virginia Niesler and the staff of the University of
Michigan Law Library. Research for this Essay was funded in part by the Cook Endowment
at the University of Michigan Law School.
1. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 152 (1963).
2. By “the original Constitution,” I mean the 1787 text without amendments. What I say
in this sentence about two possible readings is true even after the addition of the 1791
amendments, including the Tenth Amendment. See CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 140–43 (New York, G. P. Putnam’s
Sons 1890) (explaining how the text is consistent with the second possibility); Richard Primus,
The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576, 629–34 (2014) (explaining how the text of the
Tenth Amendment is consistent with the first and third possibilities above). In this Essay,
however, my argument is only about the unamended work product of the Convention.
3. These two possibilities can both be consistent with treating the powers of Congress as
a limiting list because it is possible for a list of specific powers to be tantamount to a general
power, as applied to the social world. A legislature with seven enumerated powers has in
essence a general legislative power if the seven enumerated powers are the power to legislate
on Sunday, on Monday, and so forth. See Primus, supra note 2, at 576, 581, 593–94, 636–38.
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of Rights.4 During the ratification debates, the Constitution’s leading
proponents took the position that Congress is limited to its enumerated
powers and that those powers, collectively, give Congress less authority than
a grant of general jurisdiction would.5 Indeed, these proponents explained,
the Convention had enumerated congressional powers in the Constitution
precisely so as to keep Congress’s legislative jurisdiction limited.6 For the
purpose of getting the Constitution ratified, taking that position was a prudent
move. But as many Americans recognized at the time, the claim that the
enumeration of congressional powers was intended to limit the national
government might have been disingenuous.7 The text easily supports other
readings.
The Constitution’s proponents won in 1787–88, and their representation
that the Constitution created a government limited by its enumerated powers
has long been orthodox. That orthodoxy exists not only as a matter of law
but also as a matter of narrative: within our constitutional culture, the
dominant story is that the Framers of the Constitution enumerated the powers
of Congress in order to limit the federal government.8 But as a matter of
history, that view has problems. A better view, I suggest, would
acknowledge that delegates at the Constitutional Convention might not have
conceived9 the enumeration of powers as limiting—and certainly not as the
kind of critical, limiting structure that it was later described as being. Instead,
the enumeration of powers might have been understood principally as a tool
for empowering Congress. In this short Essay, I seek to reframe the narrative
of the Convention in those terms.10
The reframed account of the Convention begins with the point that the
Framers’ animating aim was the creation of a more powerful general
government. Not everyone at the Convention was equally enthusiastic about
4. I use the term “the Bill of Rights” here in its conventional modern sense—that is, as a
shorthand reference to the first ten amendments. See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE HEART OF
THE CONSTITUTION: HOW THE BILL OF RIGHTS BECAME THE BILL OF RIGHTS 6 (2018)
(explaining that the term did not generally have that meaning in the founding era and giving
an account of how the term came to be used that way later on).
5. See, e.g., James Wilson, Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), in
13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 337, 339–40
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) [hereinafter DHRC].
6. See, e.g., id.
7. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 14
DHRC, supra note 5, at 482, 482–83.
8. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 533–35 (2012).
9. The delegates at the Convention were many people thinking many things. In this
Essay, when I speak of views held by Convention delegates, I do not mean to say that all
delegates held identical views. The same is true when I speak of views held by the Framers
of the Constitution—a phrase I use interchangeably with phrases like “the Convention
delegates.”
10. It is not my view that either the meaning of the Constitution or the correct content of
constitutional law is a unique or direct function of the ideas of the Convention delegates. “The
meaning of the Constitution” is an underspecified idea, and the determination of the correct
content of constitutional law is pretty complex. So, this Essay seeks a better understanding of
the Convention but not on the theory that such an understanding would directly yield a better
account of the legally authoritative meaning of the Constitution.
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that project, but there was little doubt that that was the project, and many of
the Framers were committed to strong forms of it. The Framers understood
that this more powerful government would need checks.11 But the checking
mechanisms on which they rested most heavily had little to do with a system
of enumerated powers.12 These mechanisms were the process limits built
into the checks-and-balances system that the Convention spent most of the
summer working out.13
It is true, as people familiar with the Convention’s proceedings know, that
the Virginia Plan’s proposal for a strong general government at the start of
the Convention provoked a call to enumerate the powers of Congress, and it
is also true that the motivation for that early call was to limit what Congress
could do.14 But that call for enumerating congressional powers was probably
motivated more by a desire to accomplish a specific thing—that is, to prevent
Congress from interfering with slavery—than by a general theory about the
allocation of power.15 What is more, that call for enumeration fizzled. The
textual enumeration of congressional powers that the Committee of Detail
produced more than two months later and that eventually became Article I,
Section 8 was not, or at least not principally, a response to that call from the
Convention’s first days. Nor was it, or at least not principally, a mechanism
for limiting the national government. Principally, it was a means for
empowering that national government.
My characterization of the enumeration of congressional powers as
principally a means of empowerment, rather than limitation, is meant to
convey that the enumeration of powers was neither all one thing nor all the
other—neither only a means of limitation nor only a means of empowerment.
Considered carefully, it had aspects of both. But the fact that something has
different aspects does not always mean that those different aspects are
equally central, or equally weighty, within it. My contention is that the
Convention’s enumeration of congressional powers is best understood more
in the register of empowerment than in that of limitation.
The balance of this Essay proceeds as follows: Part I identifies five
significant problems with the conventional narrative about why the Framers
enumerated the powers of Congress. Part II describes Article I, Section 8 as
a tool of empowerment, summarizing the reasons why empowering the
general government was important and explaining why enumerating
congressional powers would have been a good means toward that end. Part
III describes the Framers’ reasons for wanting to limit the general
11. See Primus, supra note 2, at 615–17.
12. See id. at 617–18.
13. See id. at 615–17.
14. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 53 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (May 31, 1787) (indicating that Pinckney and
Rutledge, per Madison, asked for “an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended”). It is
possible, but less clear, that a statement by John Dickinson reacting to the Virginia Plan also
suggested an enumeration of congressional powers. Id. at 42 (May 30, 1787) (statement of
John Dickinson, per McHenry). On the hazards of relying too much or too simply on the
Convention’s surviving records, see infra note 24 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part III.B.
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government and asks whether an enumeration of congressional powers
would have been a sensible tool for those purposes. The moral of the
reframed story, boiled down, is that the Convention’s enumeration of
congressional powers makes more sense as primarily a means of empowering
Congress than as primarily a means of limiting Congress—though of course,
it had aspects of both. Furthermore, to the extent that the enumeration was
intended to place limits on Congress’s legislative jurisdiction, the point of
articulating those limits was largely consistent with letting congressional
jurisdiction grow over time if the general government’s practical capacities
increased.16
Three points about the limits of this Essay are here in order. First, I do not
attempt the painstaking reconstruction of fragmentary sources that would be
required to produce a responsible narrative of the Convention, in a “here’s
what happened” way. I believe that a thorough narrative account would
confirm my argument here, but producing that account would require an
essay considerably longer than this one. For now, my aim is only to reframe
thinking about what the Convention did, not to paint a full picture within the
frame. But the framing is important, because our sense of the frame goes a
long way toward determining which narratives we are willing to find
persuasive when we try to make sense of a messy set of primary sources.
Second, my subject here is the Convention, not the discourse of
ratification, and I distrust ratification-era statements by the Constitution’s
proponents as sources of information about the Convention. During the
ratification debates, the Constitution’s supporters had incentives to underplay
the Constitution’s empowerment of the national government. So I take
ratification-era protestations by people like James Madison and James
Wilson that the enumeration was designed to limit Congress with several
grains of salt. I seek an account of the enumeration that would have been
available to a well-informed observer at the moment the Convention
adjourned, not one overlaid with what people said later.
Third, I do not claim that my reframed account, even if correct, would
require any particular approach to legal doctrine, because I do not think that
legal doctrine is or ought to be a direct consequence of ideas entertained or
even agreed on at the Convention. Depending on one’s theory of
constitutional authority, one could accept my reframed account of the
Convention but also think that, as a matter of law, courts should behave as if
limiting Congress to a set of textually enumerated powers is an essential part
of the constitutional system. By the same token, one could reject my account
but also think that courts should treat Congress as having something like
general legislative jurisdiction, subject to affirmative prohibitions like those
in the First Amendment. I will say more about this aspect of the Essay in the
conclusion.

16. This qualifier is the subject of Part III.D, which describes the relevance of the Framers’
view of the general government’s practical capacity for providing needed governance.
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I. FIVE PROBLEMS
The standard narrative explaining the Constitutional Convention’s
thinking on congressional powers goes something like this:
The Framers were committed to creating a federal government that would
pursue only a limited set of projects.17 At the start of the Convention, the
Virginia delegation’s call for a national legislature with the power “to
legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent” was a
placeholder to be used until a more specific set of powers could be crafted.18
So when the Committee of Detail turned the Convention’s agreed-upon
principles and compromises into a draft for a written constitution, it described
Congress’s legislative jurisdiction with a list of specific powers.19 With a bit
of tinkering, that list became Article I, Section 8.20 The delegates later
emphasized the importance of having given Congress a closed list of specific
powers when they overwhelmingly rejected proposals to include a Bill of
Rights within the Constitution.21 Including a Bill of Rights would imply that
Congress had the power to act except where it was affirmatively restrained.22
The deliberate omission of a Bill of Rights, the standard narrative concludes,
reflected the importance that the Convention attached to preserving the
principle—central to the system’s design—that Congress could act only on
the basis of its textually enumerated powers.23
This narrative has problems. Here are five.
First, the documents that give us the best available view of the
Convention’s proceedings suggest24 that key delegates believed Congress
17. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 533–35 (2012).
18. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 177–78 (1996) (arguing that this was a plausible way for delegates to
understand that portion of the Virginia Plan).
19. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 181–82 (Aug. 6, 1787).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
21. See Michael J. Klarman, The Founding Revisited, 125 HARV. L. REV. 544, 560 (2011)
(reviewing PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–
88 (2010)).
22. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
23. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 535 (2012) (“Indeed, the
Constitution did not initially include a Bill of Rights at least partly because the Framers felt
the enumeration of powers sufficed to restrain the Government.”).
24. Writing about what happened inside the Convention is a task that should always be
approached with caution. There is no transcript of the proceedings. There was an official
journal, but it recorded the proceedings only sparingly, making note mostly of votes taken.
See Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the Official Records of the Federal Convention?, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1620, 1623 (2012) (noting that the journal is a poor source of information
regarding most of the questions that modern Americans want answered about the Convention).
Most of the available evidence of what transpired is in the form of notes and diaries written
by specific delegates, none of which is fully reliable and some of which were clearly doctored
after the fact. See MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 141 (2015) (describing the unreliability of the sources in general and of
Madison’s notes in particular). Even delegates recording the proceedings around them in good
faith were surely liable of mischaracterizing the remarks of their fellow delegates a fair amount
of the time, if only because people in large group conversations do not always thoroughly
understand the complex thoughts that other people are trying to convey. If you have ever
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would have various powers whether or not those powers were specified in
the text of the Constitution. For example, according to Madison’s notes, John
Rutledge believed that Congress would have the power to help states put
down insurrections whether or not any clause of the Constitution so
specified;25 Nathaniel Gorham believed that Congress would have the power
to issue paper money without an express authorization;26 and James Wilson
believed that Congress would be able to punish piracies, again even in the
absence of an express authorization.27 This is not to say that nobody took
the contrary view. But Rutledge, Gorham, and Wilson were not marginal
figures. Indeed, they all sat on the committee that wrote the first draft of
Congress’s powers.28 If Madison’s notes are reliable on these points,29 these
three prominent delegates seem to have believed that there were powers that
Congress would enjoy whether expressly specified or not.30
Second, it is not true that the Framers omitted a Bill of Rights from their
draft Constitution because they trusted the enumeration of congressional
powers to limit the national government. That story was invented after the
fact, during the ratification process, in an attempt to respond to the contention
that the Constitution’s lack of a Bill of Rights was a serious flaw.31 To
defend the Constitution against that objection, some of the Constitution’s
defenders hit on the idea of arguing that the absence of a Bill of Rights was
a virtue, if only one understood the genius of what the Convention had
done.32 The public did not buy this argument: as often happens, the audience
recognized an ex post rationalization for what it was, and the demand for a

participated in a large committee meeting, or even a big family reunion, you will understand
the problem. It does not follow that we cannot responsibly make any assertions about what
happened inside the Convention. But claims about what happened should be made cautiously,
constantly mindful that each source is only partially reliable. One should not place too much
significance on the precise words attributed to any delegate, because the accounts are not
verbatim reporting; the words we read in the sources are the words of the diarists, not those of
the speakers. Perhaps most of all, one should be constantly vigilant against jumping too
quickly to the conclusion that we have grasped what someone was trying to say.
25. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 48 (July 18, 1787) (per Madison).
26. See id. at 309 (Aug. 16, 1787) (per Madison).
27. See id. at 315 (Aug. 17, 1787) (per Madison).
28. See Primus, supra note 2, at 623 n.166.
29. As Mary Sarah Bilder has explained, Madison’s notes are especially unreliable for the
portion of the Convention that occurred after August 21, 1787. See BILDER, supra note 24, at
141. The three pieces of evidence just described all come from his record of events before
that date.
30. As a matter of practice, constitutional law seems to track this position—albeit
sometimes unofficially, without express judicial acknowledgment—with respect to several
congressional powers. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians,
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign
Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 (2002) (documenting areas of recognized but nonenumerated
congressional power); Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III, and the Limits of Enumeration, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1389, 1396–1401 (2010) (illustrating the point with reference to immigration
and foreign affairs powers).
31. See Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting
Rights: The View from 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 377–78 (2007).
32. Id. at 379.
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Bill of Rights continued unabated.33 Today, of course, constitutional lawyers
commonly accept the rationalization as if it were fact. But that just means
that the Constitution’s 1788 supporters managed to fool future generations
on this point, despite failing to fool their contemporaries.
The third problem is more subtle. The standard account invites readers to
imagine the drafters saying, “We’re going to make a list of congressional
powers, on the understanding that Congress can only do the things on the
list.” Moreover, the standard account invites readers to imagine that the
drafters then proceeded to write such a list—and that that list became Article
I, Section 8. But Article I, Section 8 is not a comprehensive list of the powers
that the Convention allocated to Congress. In the original Constitution, more
than a third of the clauses granting power to Congress are outside of Article
I, Section 8.34 The standard narrative imagines a list of powers implicitly
headed, “These powers and no others,” when in fact the implicit heading of
Section 8, from the Framers’ point of view, would have had to be something
like, “These powers, among others.” To be sure, one could have a system in
which Congress may only exercise affirmatively enumerated powers even if
those powers are scattered throughout the Constitution, rather than collected
in a single list. But the notion of a limiting enumeration is easiest to maintain
if there exists, somewhere, a single list of the things that Congress is
authorized to do. The Framers wrote no such list. And the fact that
constitutional law commonly speaks as if Section 8 were a complete list of
congressional powers35—even though it obviously is not—may suggest
something about the profession’s impulse to present things as if they
accorded with a tidy story about a limiting enumeration—even when they do
not.
Fourth, a problem arises about the mandate of the Convention’s
Committee of Detail, which was the first drafting body to produce an
enumeration of congressional powers and whose draft was accepted by the
Convention with only minor emendations.36 That committee’s instructions
included not just the original language of Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan,
33. Id. at 377–78.
34. Counting conservatively, the original Constitution had eleven such clauses outside of
Section 8. The Constitution as it exists today has twenty-five, again counting conservatively.
35. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 876 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Once a treaty has been made, Congress’s power to do what is ‘necessary and proper’ to
assist the making of treaties drops out of the picture. To legislate compliance with the United
States’ treaty obligations, Congress must rely upon its independent (though quite robust)
Article I, § 8 powers.”); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 135 (2010) (“Of course, as
Chief Justice Marshall stated, a federal statute, in addition to being authorized by Art. I, § 8,
must also ‘not [be] prohibited’ by the Constitution.” (alteration in original) (quoting
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819))); Robert D. Cooter & Neil S.
Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 115 (2010); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1687, 1695 (2004) (“[O]ur first structural principle [is] that the courts do indeed possess
authority to police the Article I, Section 8 powers.”).
36. For a wonderfully thorough and thoughtful account of the work of the Committee of
Detail, see generally William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197
(2012).
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according to which Congress should be empowered “to legislate in all cases
to which the separate States are incompetent”37 but an amended form of the
resolution proposed by Delaware’s Gunning Bedford, according to which
Congress would also have power “to legislate in all cases for the general
interests of the Union.”38 That augmented formula, approved by a vote of
eight states to two,39 does not seem to call for a constitution that limits
Congress to a list of specific projects. To be sure, it is the Constitution rather
than the proceedings of the Convention that is the supreme law, so if the
Constitution contradicts (the Bedford-modified) Resolution VI, it is the
Constitution that prevails. But to my knowledge, no scholar has produced a
persuasive, evidence-based account establishing how and when (let alone
why) the Convention decided to discard the instructions it gave the
Committee of Detail and to accept a constitution characterized by a limiting
enumeration, rather than one enabling Congress to legislate in the broad
national-interest way that (the Bedford-modified) Resolution VI
envisioned.40 The standard account of the limiting enumeration must say
either that Resolution VI actually meant something less than it seems to or
else that the Convention reversed itself—from an 8 to 2 vote, no less—
without leaving a record of when or why. Perhaps some such explanation is
correct: the records of the Convention are incomplete, after all. But it will
not do to say things like, “Well, the fact that they wrote a limiting
enumeration shows that they must have changed their minds.” Whether the
enumeration was written to be limiting is precisely the question at issue.
Fifth and finally, a point about the relationship between intentions and
results. As every modern constitutional lawyer knows, the Constitution’s
enumeration of congressional powers has not, in practice, prevented
Congress from pursuing the projects for which it musters political will. The
Constitution shapes Congress’s ambitions through the structure of the
lawmaking process—elections, bicameralism, presentment—and the courts
have invalidated congressional legislation on the basis of affirmative
prohibitions like those in the First Amendment,41 as well as on the basis of
nontextual affirmative prohibitions conventionally associated with the Tenth
Amendment (like the anti-commandeering rules).42 The courts have also
invalidated congressional legislation on the grounds that such legislation
violates the prerogatives of the other federal branches.43 But from the First
Congress forward—albeit with an exceptional period around the turn of the
twentieth century—courts have done precious little by way of using the

37. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 17 (July 16, 1787).
38. Id. at 21 (July 17, 1787).
39. Id. at 27.
40. For a good account of this problem and the ways in which various scholars have
approached it, see Jonathan Gienapp, In Search of Nationhood at the Founding, 89 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1783, 1799–1801, 1799 n.110 (2021).
41. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
42. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
43. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 unconstitutional).
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enumeration of congressional powers to limit the scope of national
policymaking.44 This fact does not prove that the Framers did not intend the
enumeration as meaningfully limiting. But if they did so intend, then it must
be accepted that the Framers were, in this crucial respect, quite bad at
constitutional design because a central part of the machinery seems to have
utterly failed, more or less from the inception. Nor can the Framers be
rescued from this charge by saying that their design was good but that the
Constitution has been systematically misapplied by judges and other officials
from 1789 forward; the correct anticipation of how real people in office will
act is a necessary part of successful constitutional design.
None of these problems necessarily falsifies the standard account. One
could produce plausible arguments explaining each problem away, especially
if the problems are taken one by one. But sometimes the accumulation of
problems within a narrative is a sign that something about that narrative
really is wrong, just as an accumulation of epicycles can signal the need to
revise an underlying theory. In the present case, it is possible to revise the
dominant understanding of the Convention in a way that leaves readers with
fewer and less serious problems. And the first step toward a better account
is the recognition that the Convention’s animating purpose was the creation
of a powerful general government.
II. ENUMERATION AS EMPOWERMENT
A. The Need to Empower
Bad Governts. are of two sorts. I. that which does too little. 2. that which
does too much: that which fails thro’ weakness; and that which destroys
thro’ oppression. Under which of these evils do the U. States at present
groan? under the weakness and inefficiency of its Governt. To remedy this
weakness we have been sent to this Convention.
—James Wilson45

44. It is possible that the striking absence of court cases holding federal statutes to exceed
the enumerated powers of Congress does not mean that the enumeration of powers has not in
fact limited Congress, because it is possible that the enumeration of powers has limited
Congress’s own conception of what it should do. It is certainly the case that the idea that the
enumeration is limiting has sometimes been marshaled within Congress as an argument
against legislation, and it is possible that the marshaling of that argument had some tendency
to prevent Congress from passing legislation that otherwise would have been passed. Between
the Andrew Jackson administration and the Civil War, the idea of a Congress limited by its
enumerated powers was an important piece of the constitutional ideology holding the
Democratic Party together, so it is plausible that that idea had some influence on what
Congress did. See Richard Primus & Roderick M. Hills Jr., Suspect Spheres, Not Enumerated
Powers: A Guide for Leaving the Lamppost, 119 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). But it
is hard to know for sure. After all, it is also possible that most arguments about enumerated
powers in Congress have been makeweights, or reflections of substantive opposition to the
relevant legislation, and that there just was not majority support in Congress for the legislation,
such that arguments about constitutional limits were not changing outcomes.
45. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 483–84 (June 30, 1787) (statement of James
Wilson as recorded by Madison ).
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The Articles of Confederation provided for a unicameral Congress.46 That
Congress—or the “general government,” as Americans often called Congress
and the small collection of officials it directed47—was a weak institution. By
1787, it was clear to many Americans that the general government’s
weakness was a serious problem.48
For starters, Congress had trouble raising money, including the money it
needed to pay debts incurred during the Revolutionary War.49 Congress had
no power to impose taxes.50 Instead, it was supposed to make requisitions of
the states, meaning that Congress could identify an amount of money that
each state was supposed to raise and contribute to the federal treasury.51 But
Congress had no power to compel payment, and the states never paid their
requisitions in full, if they paid them at all.52 As a result, the United States
could not repay loans that it owed to foreign countries, and that made the new
nation’s international standing somewhat dicey.53 Nor could Congress
reliably pay its own employees, including the members of the small U.S.
Army.54 Organizing his thoughts in advance of the Convention, Madison
described this problem as both fatal to and inherent in the existing structure
of American government. It resulted, he wrote, “naturally from the number
and independent authority of the States.”55
The failure of the states to act as a union created many problems in foreign
affairs. When Britain imposed trade restrictions on American ships,
Congress could not order a unified American response.56 The same was true
when Spain closed the Mississippi River to American shipping and when
pirates seized American ships in the Mediterranean Sea.57 Moreover, several
states took actions that violated the Treaty of Paris, which had ended the
Revolutionary War.58 For example, the treaty provided that Americans who
had remained loyal to Britain during the war would not be treated as criminals
and that their remaining property would not be expropriated.59 But states
violated those guarantees, and Congress could do nothing to make the states
comply.60 Given American noncompliance, Britain often refused to adhere
46. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V.
47. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 7, at 482–83; see
also 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 284 (June 18, 1787) (statement of Alexander
Hamilton, as rendered by Madison); id. at 357 (June 21, 1787) (statement of James Madison,
as rendered by Madison).
48. See MAIER, supra note 21, at 11–17.
49. See id. at 11.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 11–12.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 12–13.
55. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, reprinted in 2 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1783–1787, at 361, 361 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
56. See MAIER, supra note 21, at 12.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 13.
59. See id.
60. See id.
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to its obligations under the treaty, including its obligation to complete the
withdrawal of its forces from North America.61 So, even after the war was
over, British garrisons remained within the borders of some American
states.62 Congress could do nothing about it.
Domestic affairs were difficult as well. Many states pursued protectionist
economic policies, essentially treating other states like foreign countries for
economic purposes.63 One state’s actions to the detriment of another state
naturally produced retaliatory measures with results that were bad for most
people involved. In some places, economic hardship led to violence,
including most famously in western Massachusetts in an uprising known as
Shays’s Rebellion.64 And Congress could do little or nothing to bring
economic stability or cooperation to the states. It had relatively little power,
and the power it had was regularly flouted.
Moreover, the domestic governance problems in the United States were
not simply a matter of weakness at the center. The state governments were
themselves often ineffective, even within their own boundaries.65 Shays’s
Rebellion is again emblematic: the problem was not merely the adverse
economic conditions that motivated the rebellion but also the weakness of
the state government, which could barely maintain its own authority against
the rebels.66 Constitutional law’s standard telling of the transition from the
Articles of Confederation to the Constitution underplays this problem
because it depicts the system under the Articles as one of “sovereign” states,
and sovereign states are usually imagined as capable of internal governance.
But in the 1780s, the United States was not a place neatly carved up among
what modern social scientists would recognize as Weberian states—that is,
governments enjoying monopolies on legitimate violence within
geographically defined territories.67 For one thing, many of the states lacked
clear geographic boundaries: a fair amount of territory was claimed by more
than one state at a time.68 Perhaps more to the point, the state governments
often exercised their authority, not as the exclusively legitimate powers from
which all other legitimate political authority must flow within the territories
they claimed but as important actors within a complex ecosystem of other
61. See id. at 396.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 14.
64. See id. at 15–17. See generally SHAYS’ REBELLION: SELECTED ESSAYS (Martin
Kaufman ed., 1987).
65. See MAIER, supra note 21, at 16.
66. See id. at 15–16.
67. See Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE
L.J. 1792, 1804–08 (2019); see also Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 78 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946) (defining the state
as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of
physical force within a given territory”). For an important exploration of the possibility that
the Weberian model is inapposite for the analysis of American states even long after the
founding period, see William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM.
HIST. REV. 752, 761–71 (2008).
68. See Craig Green, United/States: A Revolutionary History of American Statehood, 119
MICH. L. REV. 1, 35–40 (2020).
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power-wielding institutions: corporations, towns, churches, Native Nations,
separatist movements, and so on.69 Shays’s Rebellion was a particularly
prominent episode in which the authority of a state to govern within its
claimed territory was called into serious question, but it was by no means the
only one.70
In that light, as Professor Gregory Ablavsky has explained, the standard
story on which the adoption of the Constitution relocated sovereignty from
the state governments to the United States obscures a messier reality.71 In
practice, the pre-1789 state governments could not easily exercise the kind
of power that sovereignty usually implies—power to which every other actor
must yield.72 And contrary to the normal zero-sum presentation, the creation
of a stronger national government was an opportunity for the state
governments to become more powerful in practice. After all, the Constitution
did not merely create a stronger general government. It created a system in
which the only players other than that general government were the state
governments. With a more robust general government at their backs, the
state governments could clear the field of local claimants (towns, counties,
And the
corporations) to autonomy or quasi-sovereign power.73
Constitution’s promoters clearly understood that their plan offered this
benefit to the state governments. Hamilton’s Federalist No. 9, for example,
is an advertisement for the Union’s ability to marshal overwhelming force to
crush insurrections against the various state governments.74
This understanding of the condition of the state governments in 1787
provides important context for reconstructing the Framers’ senses of the
relationship between a stronger general government and effective local
government. If the state governments are imagined as firmly rooted and fully
functional local sovereigns under the Articles, then it is natural to think that
serious people in 1787 would have wanted to adjust the power of the general
government only slightly—enough to improve coordination among the states
but not enough to do much more than that.75 But if the state governments are
imagined as a bit more rickety, the field of possibilities looks different. In
particular, it is then easier to understand why serious people would have been
keen to vest extensive power in a national government—and perhaps to
worry more about empowering the national government too little than about
69. See Ablavsky, supra note 67, at 1795–96.
70. See id. at 1810–11, 1815.
71. See id. at 1796.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra note 22 (Alexander Hamilton). Read next to its
neighbor, Madison’s argument in Federalist No. 10 that the extended republic will “break and
control the violence of faction,” looks like a bloodless sequel—the same argument, but with
less at stake. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 22 (James Madison). After all, the
“violence” to be broken and controlled in Federalist No. 10 is largely metaphorical. See id.
75. One important strain of scholarship has depicted the Convention’s aim as the creation
of a general government empowered to solve collective action problems among the states. See
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 35, at 115. The present analysis suggests that solving collective
action problems was only part of why a more powerful general government was needed.
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empowering it too much. That, of course, is the attitude on display in the
comment by Wilson76 that opens this section of this Essay.
For all these reasons, the delegates who went to the Philadelphia
Convention in 1787 went to create a more powerful central government.
They were not all of one mind about how that new government should
function. There were fifty-five of them, after all. But the common problem
that they faced was a deficit of government power, and their disagreements
would concern the best ways to make their general government more
powerful.
B. The Utility of Enumerating Powers
To understand the utility of enumerating congressional powers as a means
of making the general government sufficiently powerful, it is useful to keep
in mind two facts that confronted the Framers. First, their envisioned
government would function in a world where not everyone would be happy
about the general government’s exercising consequential powers. Objections
might be rooted in general opposition to national governance, in displeasure
with specific measures taken, or both. But for one reason or another, the new
government’s actions were sure to be frequently opposed, and the question
of its power to take action would be frequently contested. People would
argue about whether the government could do this or that thing. When that
happened, a constitution that described congressional power only in general
terms would not be much help.77 Imagine, for example, a constitution
declaring, in the words of Resolution VI, that Congress had the power “to
legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those
to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of
the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
legislation.”78 Objectors to congressional legislation would then predictably
argue that this or that matter did not touch the general interests of the Union
and was not beyond the competence of the states separately and raised no
issue related to the harmony of the United States. If the decisionmakers
turned out to be skeptics about central power—and keep in mind that many
decisions might be made in state courts—then those arguments would often
be accepted, thus defeating the major purpose of holding the Philadelphia
Convention in the first place.79 On the other hand, if the Constitution spoke
more specifically about which powers Congress was entitled to exercise—
say, the power to tax, to regulate commerce, or to make bankruptcy laws—
76. As rendered by Madison, anyway. See Wilson, supra note 5, at 339.
77. Assuming, of course, that the general principle was not something like “Congress may
legislate however it likes.”
78. This is the language of Resolution VI as amended on July 17, 1787, on the motion of
Gunning Bedford. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 21 (July 17, 1787). It was in this
form that Resolution VI was given as an instruction to the Committee of Detail when that
Committee set about writing the first actual draft of the Constitution.
79. A generally stated formula for broad congressional power could get the job done if all
the decisionmakers were reliable Federalists. But they would not be, and the Convention
delegates knew that.

2016

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

then defenders of congressional action could more easily establish their
position by pointing to specific authorizations in the constitutional text.80 If
a government actor wants a skeptic to accept his authority to take a certain
action, it is helpful not just to have the authority in writing but also for the
written statement of his authority to state his relevant power in specific
language.81
A second background fact raised the premium on putting specific
congressional authorities in writing.82 The Articles of Confederation
enumerated a set of congressional powers.83 Those powers included the
power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, to regulate trade
with Indian tribes, to coin money and regulate its value, to fix standards for
weights and measures, to establish post offices, to declare war, to grant letters
of marque and reprisal, to make rules concerning captures on land and on
water, to provide for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas, to build and equip a navy, and to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces.84 The Framers repeated those
specific authorizations in Article I, Section 8, and it is not hard to see why.
Omitting specific mention of a power specified in the Articles would risk the
inference that a power conferred by the Articles was not conferred by the
Constitution.85
Moreover, even if future interpreters of the Constitution correctly
concluded that some powers not specified in the constitutional text were
80. I say “more easily” rather than “reliably” because people can also argue about what
constitutes a tax, or a regulation of commerce, or a bankruptcy law. But over a broad domain
of actions Congress might take, the more specific authorizations set the boundaries of
reasonable argument in a more Congress-friendly location.
81. Consider in this connection the strategy adopted by the drafters of the Canadian
Constitution, who worked eighty years after the Philadelphia Convention and who could draw
on the lessons of the American experience. In Canada’s Constitution, the text setting forth the
legislative authority of Parliament—Section 91—contains a general statement of power “to
make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada.” Constitution Act, 1867,
30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 91 (U.K.). That clause—the “POGG Clause”—is followed by an
enumerated list of specific matters to which Parliament’s legislative authority extends. Id.
And Section 91 expressly explains that the enumerated list follows “for greater Certainty, but
not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section” (i.e., the POGG
Clause). Id. In other words, the list of specific powers is provided to make certain that the
particular subjects identified there—public debt, the regulation of trade and commerce, raising
money by taxation, and so forth—fall within the broad grant of the POGG Clause, rather than
taking the risk that subsequent decisionmakers might construe “Peace, Order, and good
Government” narrowly enough to exclude the enumerated subjects. See id.
82. An earlier version of the point made in these two paragraphs appears in 1 WILLIAM
WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
410–28, 465–67 (1953).
83. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX.
84. See id.
85. Later readers of the Constitution understood this point, arguing for the significance of
the absence in the Constitution of something that appeared in the Articles. See, e.g., Centinel
II, PHILA. FREEMAN’S J., Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 5, at 457, 460
(noting that the Articles of Confederation expressly specified the principle that each state
retained all powers not expressly delegated to the United States); see also McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819) (noting that the Constitution, unlike the
Articles, did not affirmatively exclude incidental powers).
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meant to be vested in the national government, they might then divide on the
question of where in the national government those powers were lodged.
Under the Articles, all powers vested in the United States were held by a
single institution: the United States in Congress assembled.86 But under the
Constitution, “Congress” became just one of three branches of government—
and it could not automatically be assumed that the powers held by the United
States in Congress assembled under the Articles would be powers of
Congress in the new three-branch system. Some of the powers that the
Articles had given to the United States in Congress assembled—like the
power to send and receive ambassadors and the power to direct military
operations87—would under the Constitution be allocated to the president.88
To omit express instructions about who in the new government could
exercise which powers mentioned in the Articles would therefore beg some
obvious questions.89 Worse still, several of the powers that the Framers
wanted to assign to Congress were powers associated with the king, rather
than Parliament, in Blackstone’s description of the British Constitution.90 So
it was more than foreseeable that in the absence of a contrary instruction,
people would argue that those powers were naturally vested in the president
rather than in Congress. If the Framers wanted Congress to wield those
powers, they needed to say so explicitly.
Nothing about these rationales for expressly enumerating many powers of
Congress required that all of the powers of Congress be enumerated. The
point of the enumeration, understood this way, was not to rule out powers not
mentioned. It was to rule in a bunch of powers that were important to specify,
lest Congress’s authority to exercise those powers be doubted.91 And within

86. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II.
87. See id. art. IX.
88. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (power to appoint ambassadors); id. § 3 (power to
receive ambassadors); id. § 2, cl. 1 (power to act as commander in chief of military forces).
89. This separation of powers problem also explains why the Convention could not solve
the first problem—that is, of negating the inference that a power specified in the Articles was
also vested in the general government under the Constitution—with a blanket statement like:
“All power vested in the United States under the Articles continues to be vested in the United
States under the Constitution.” Such a statement would not address the crucial question of
who, under the Constitution, could exercise that power on behalf of the United States.
90. Blackstone’s list of Crown powers included the powers to regulate commerce,
naturalize aliens, coin money, regulate weights and measures, establish courts, declare war,
issue letters of marque and reprisal, and raise and regulate armies and navies. See 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *244–68. This fact suggests a reason why the Convention
could not solve the problem of allocating powers specified in the Articles among the branches
of the new government by writing something like: “All legislative powers vested in the United
States under the Confederation shall be vested in Congress, and all executive powers vested
in the United States under the Confederation shall be vested in a President.” In a world where
several powers the Framers wanted to allocate to Congress were prominently identified as
Crown powers, invoking the categories “legislative” and “executive” might not be a reliable
way of producing the specific allocation they wanted.
91. Just like Section 91 of the Canadian Constitution. See supra note 81. The fact that the
Canadian Constitution makes this clear (by using the POGG Clause as well as an enumeration
of powers) while the U.S. Constitution does not might reflect a difference in how the
constitutions were supposed to function, but it might also reflect the Canadians’ having
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a system where Congress was understood to possess many powers, including
but not limited to, those expressly specified, the considerations just discussed
would supply good reasons for enumerating a list of powers that looks a lot
like Article I, Section 8.
III. ENUMERATION AS LIMITATION
The Framers wanted to limit the general government as well as empower
it. But given their reasons for limiting the general government and given
what enumerations of powers are and are not good for, it is not clear why
they would have chosen an enumeration of powers as a device for doing the
limiting work.
To begin to see why not, it is important to recognize that something known
now about enumerating legislative powers was not entirely unknown to the
Framers. Constitutional lawyers today generally recognize that the
enumeration of Congress’s powers does not much constrain Congress in
practice. With the exception of a period early in the twentieth century,92
Congress has been able to do pretty much anything for which it has mustered
political will,93 and the courts have construed Congress’s powers as
sufficient to warrant whatever it is that Congress decided needed to be done.
The anomalous judicial resistance of the early twentieth century came to a
crashing and inglorious end.94 Committed believers in enumerationism
might protest that this pattern reveals not something inherent in the system
of enumerated powers but simply the poor performance of American
officials—especially judges—who have failed to implement the system
properly.95 It is hard to falsify such a claim directly, but when an argument
relies on the premise that an entire professional class has done its job badly
for a very long time, it is worth considering whether what is lacking is the
behavior of all those people or the idea that they are supposed to be doing
something else. In any event, a feature of a constitutional system is only as
good as it is in practice. Put differently: if the Framers wanted to impose
serious limits on federal legislation, and they had known what every modern
constitutional lawyer knows about whether the enumeration has limited
Congress in practice, it is hard to imagine that the Framers would have put
their eggs in that basket.
learned, by observing American constitutional discourse, that in the absence of something like
a POGG Clause the function of an enumeration of powers might be misunderstood.
92. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918).
93. Again, it is possible that the idea of a limiting enumeration has done limiting work
within Congress or at least that it did so during an important stretch of the nineteenth century.
See supra note 44. But even that possibility is speculative. And in the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries, it seems hard to identify projects that Congress would have liked to pursue but
abstained from pursuing due to the limits of Congress’s enumerated powers.
94. See generally JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME
COURT (2010).
95. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 1 (2013) (“Had judges done their job, this book would not need to
be written.”).
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To be sure, we now know things about how the system has operated that
the Framers could not know. But their ignorance should not be
overestimated. Some of them knew already in the 1780s that enumerating
the powers of a legislature was not a reliable way to impose ex ante limits on
what that legislature will do in practice. Madison knew it, and he said so.96
The better ways to limit a legislature, in his view, were with affirmative
prohibitions (like the ones in Article I, Section 9) and with what modern
theorists call “process limits” (like bicameralism, executive presentment, and
the requirement that legislators stand frequently for election).97 There is no
reason to think that Madison was unique in holding these views. Other
leading Framers also expressed doubts about the practicability of dividing
national and local spheres of action by enumerating the powers of
Congress.98 And to the extent that one can infer what the Convention thought
of as the most important parts of its work by looking at how much time and
discussion was spent on particular subjects, it certainly seems that the
Framers regarded process limits as considerably more important than the
enumeration of congressional powers.
This is not to say that nobody at the Convention thought of enumerating
Congress’s powers as a mechanism capable of imposing meaningful limits
on that institution. The Framers were many people thinking many things.
But in asking whether it makes sense to think that the Convention generally
saw enumeration as a means of limitation—or, perhaps more precisely, to
think about the relative proportions in which its members thought of it as a
means of limitation rather than a means of empowerment—it is important to
avoid imagining the Framers as less sophisticated about real-world
governance than they actually were. If enumerating powers is not a
particularly effective way to limit a legislature and if eighteenth-century
Americans recognized that fact, then we should be open to thinking that
although the Framers wanted to put limits on Congress, they might not have
relied on enumerating congressional powers to do the job. Certainly many
of the Constitution’s opponents said outright that the enumeration of powers
would not limit Congress,99 and they have turned out to be right. Maybe the
Framers were as discerning as their opponents.

96. See Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in 2 THE WRITINGS
supra note 55, at 166, 168.
97. Id. at 167–69.
98. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 59–60 (May 31, 1787) (statement
of Roger Sherman, as rendered by Pierce); id. at 172 (June 8, 1787) (statement of John
Dickerson, as rendered by King) (“There can be no line of separation dividing the powers of
legislation between the State & Genl. Govts.”).
99. Including some who attended the Convention. See SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 251 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987)
(statement of Mason characterizing the draft Constitution as having given indefinite power to
the national government); Brutus XII, N.Y.J., Feb. 7, 1788, reprinted in 16 DHRC, supra note
5, at 72, 74 (pseudonymous letter of New York delegate Robert Yates) (writing that under the
Constitution, the general government’s power would “extend to every case for which any
government is instituted”). Randolph was not exactly an opponent—he supported the
Constitution during ratification, though he refused to sign the draft at Philadelphia—but he
OF JAMES MADISON 1783–1787,
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With that point as background, I now turn to four leading reasons why
delegates at the Convention might have wanted to limit Congress, and I ask
about the suitability of enumeration as a tool for each.
A. Liberty
Many Americans in the 1780s wanted to limit the general government
because they feared that republican liberty could not survive in a polity as
large as the United States.100 The central concern, boiled down, was that the
country was too vast and the population too large for the people and the
government officials who supposedly represented them to know and trust
each other.101 The people would thus (correctly) come to perceive the
government as alien rather than representative, and the government’s
authority would need to rely more and more on force rather than goodwill.102
Down that road lay tyranny. George Washington’s one recorded substantive
intervention in the Convention’s proceedings may have been intended to
address just this threat. According to multiple accounts, Washington, shortly
before the Convention adjourned, spoke in favor of increasing the permitted
number of representatives in Congress for each state from one for every
40,000 residents to one for every 30,000.103 More representatives per capita
would reduce the threat that the people and the government would become
alien to one another.104 The Convention accepted the change.105
saw the same thing. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 488–89 (Sept. 3, 1787)
(statement of Edmund Randolph, as rendered by Madison).
100. See DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830, at 221
(2005).
101. See, e.g., Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Pendleton (May 26, 1788), in 9
DHRC, supra note 5, at 878, 879; Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Samuel Adams (Apr. 28,
1788), in 9 DHRC, supra note 5, at 765, 765.
102. See HULSEBOSCH, supra note 100, at 221.
103. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 643–44 (Sept. 17, 1787) (as recorded in
Madison’s notes); 3 id. at 337 (June 24, 1788) (as described by Hamilton at the New York
ratifying convention); see also id. at 358 (Aug. 14, 1789) (as recollected by Roger Sherman,
speaking in the House of Representatives).
104. Not everyone described the change from 40,000 to 30,000 as motivated by this benign
purpose. See Luther Martin, Att’y Gen. of Md., Genuine Information (Nov. 29, 1787),
reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 172, 199–200 (describing the change as
motivated by a desire to increase the power of large states, whose populations could be
expected to grow more quickly).
105. The degree of enthusiasm with which the Convention accepted the change is a matter
of dispute in the surviving records. According to Madison’s notes, the motion was agreed to
unanimously. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 644 (Sept. 17, 1787). That portion
of Madison’s notes was written at least two years after the Convention rose, rather than
contemporaneously. See BILDER, supra note 24, at 141. According to the Annals of Congress,
however, Roger Sherman in 1789 said that “not more than nine States” had voted in favor of
the change. See 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 358. The gap between presenting
the change as unanimous and presenting it as contested might reflect a difference in attitude
as to whether the measure was motivated by impartial motives. Madison, who described the
change as unanimous, wrote that the motion had been introduced by Gorham “for the purpose
of lessening objections to the Constitution.” See 2 id. at 643 (Sept. 17, 1787). Sherman, who
described the change as contested, represented a state that, on Martin’s somewhat darker
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The fear of an unrepresentative government could certainly motivate
people to want that government’s powers to be limited—even severely
limited. But it does not follow that the Convention’s enumeration of
congressional powers was substantially motivated by this concern. It is hard
to identify people who worried that the general government created by the
Constitution would be sufficiently nonrepresentative as to risk devolution
into tyranny but who also thought that the Constitution’s enumeration of
powers was anything like a satisfactory solution. The powers that Congress
was affirmatively given, including the powers to tax and to raise armies, were
sufficient tools of oppression in the hands of a government inclined to wield
them that way.106
The sensible solution to the problem that a remote and unrepresentative
government would become tyrannical over time would not have been to limit
that government to a specific set of powers, including those powers most
valuable to a tyrannical oppressor. It would have been either to make the
government more representative or to take other steps to prevent the
government from exercising its potentially tyrannical powers abusively.
Washington’s intervention about the number of representatives per capita
was a form of the first strategy107: it aimed to bolster confidence that a
national government could be adequately representative, not to mitigate the
threat posed by a nonrepresentative government by limiting its powers. The
work that occupied most of the Convention’s attention—that of structuring a
system of checks and balances—embodied the second strategy.108
B. Slavery
For many Americans, the abstract concern with protecting republican
liberty coexisted—uneasily or otherwise—with a concrete imperative to
perpetuate chattel slavery.109 Slaveholders in states where slavery was strong
wanted to be certain that a powerful national government would not become
a vehicle for emancipation. At the Convention, the most prominent early
calls to enumerate Congress’s powers came from Charles Pinckney, John
Rutledge, and Pierce Butler—all from South Carolina.110 These men were
interpretation of the change, would stand to be disadvantaged relative to the large states if the
change were adopted. See infra note 109.
106. See, e.g., Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 101, at
879–80 (expressing the concern that the country would be too large for government to be
representative and identifying the enumerated congressional power to tax as sufficient to
render “resistance vain”); George Mason, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June
14, 1788), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 410, 416 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, Jonathan Elliot 2d ed.
1836).
107. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
108. See Primus, supra note 2, at 616.
109. At least some Convention delegates were aware of the tension. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 14, at 364 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of Luther Martin, as rendered by
Madison) (describing a constitutional provision protecting the importation of slaves as
“inconsistent with the principles of the revolution and dishonorable to the American
character”).
110. 1 id. at 53 (May 31, 1787) (as recorded by Madison).
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not, as a general matter, skeptical of centralizing power.111 Over the course
of the Convention, all would play important roles in pushing for a vigorous
general government. But South Carolina had a keen interest in ensuring that
one particular subject matter—or to use a local term, one domestic
institution—would remain under South Carolina’s control rather than being
subjected to the authority of the United States in general.112 Pinckney’s
cousin and fellow South Carolina delegate Charles Cotesworth Pinckney told
the Convention bluntly that South Carolina would support no Constitution
that did not give Southern states protection against emancipation.113 So
when these generally pro-national-power delegates said it was important to
enumerate Congress’s powers, they might have had a particular aim in mind.
The South Carolinians’ early call for enumerating congressional powers
was an immediate response to the Virginia Plan’s Resolution VI, which
recommended a congress able to legislate “in all cases to which the State
Legislatures were individually incompetent.”114 It is not hard to imagine
delegates primed to spot threats to slavery seeing danger in that general
language and responding with a call for greater specificity. But if so, the
South Carolinians may have quickly realized that enumerating Congress’s
powers was not the best strategy for vindicating their interest. After a
conversation in which several delegates expressed skepticism about the
practicability of separating national and local spheres of authority by
enumerating congressional powers,115 the South Carolina delegates backed
off of their request for greater specificity and joined all the other states but
Connecticut in approving Resolution VI.116
That did not mean, of course, that South Carolina’s delegates had
moderated their commitment to protecting slavery. But perhaps they realized
that different strategies made more sense. One of those better strategies
looked to affirmative prohibitions, and the other looked to voting power
within the political process.
With respect to affirmative prohibitions, as the Convention progressed,
South Carolina’s delegates insisted on two affirmative prohibitions on
congressional power: one prohibiting Congress from preventing the
111. See id. at 144 (June 6, 1787) (statement of Pierce Butler, per King) (articulating
openness to abolishing the state legislatures and creating a single consolidated national
government); id. at 162 (June 8, 1787) (per Convention Journal) (discussing Charles
Pinckney’s motion to give Congress the power to veto all state laws “which to them shall
appear improper”); 2 id. at 48 (July 18, 1787) (statement of John Rutledge, per Madison)
(articulating that Congress would have the power to suppress insurrections in the states even
if no such power were expressly specified).
112. See 2 id. at 95 (July 23, 1787).
113. See id.
114. 1 id. at 53 (May 31, 1787) (as recorded by Madison).
115. See id. (statement of James Madison, as recorded by Madison); id. at 59–60
(statements of Roger Sherman, James Wilson, and James Madison, as recorded by Pierce).
116. See id. at 53–54 (as recorded by Madison); see also id. at 47 (as recorded in
Convention Journal). Seven weeks later, when the Convention adopted a strengthened form
of Resolution VI on which Congress would also have power “to legislate in all cases for the
general interests of the Union,” South Carolina and Georgia cast the only votes in opposition.
See 2 id. at 21, 24 (July 17, 1787) (per Convention Journal).
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importation of slaves and one banning the taxation of exports.117 The
relevance of the first prohibition is obvious and that of the second only a bit
less so. As the delegates understood, the general government could endanger
slavery either by legislating against it directly or, if prohibited from doing
that, by taxing the export of the Southern states’ slave-produced agricultural
products to the point of unprofitability.118 This strategy of protecting an
important local interest with affirmative prohibitions on Congress, rather
than by omitting relevant powers from Congress’s arsenal, was eminently
logical. If one’s goal is to protect a particular activity from national power,
it makes considerably more sense to create an immunity for that activity than
to pursue the indirect strategy of giving Congress twenty or thirty powers and
calculating that none of them can be deployed to interfere with that activity.
(Especially if the powers given to Congress include, say, the powers to tax
and to regulate commerce.) Consider: despite the claims of some leading
Federalists, the public knew better than to believe that the enumeration of
congressional powers made the freedoms of speech and press secure.119
Affirmative prohibitions were a more logical means to that end. The South
Carolina delegates surely knew the same thing about slavery.120
And with respect to voting power within the political process, the ThreeFifths Clause121 and the Electoral College would enhance Southern power in
the general government, thus preventing that government from exercising its
powers in ways hostile to slavery. Indeed, there are some indications that
Southern delegates expected this arrangement to protect their interests even
more powerfully in the long term than in the short term, because they
expected new western states to align mostly with the South.122 On that
assumption, South Carolina could agree in 1787 to constitutional protection
117. See 2 id. at 306 (Aug. 16, 1787) (statement of John Rutledge, as rendered by Madison);
id. at 364–65 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of Charles Pinckney, as rendered by Madison).
Delegates with other ideas forced a compromise on the latter prohibition under which
Congress could prohibit the slave trade in or after the year 1808. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 1.
118. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 360 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of Oliver
Ellsworth, as rendered by Madison) (explaining that the debate over taxing exports was really
only about a small number of taxable exportable commodities, namely tobacco, rice, and
indigo); id. (reporting that “Mr. Butler was strenuously opposed to a power over exports; as
unjust and alarming to the staple States,” per Madison); id. at 364 (statement of John Rutledge,
as rendered by Madison) (noting the direct connection between the size of the slave population
and the volume of exportable commodities).
119. See Primus, supra note 2, at 615–18.
120. That being the case, one might well ask why South Carolina’s delegates did not pursue
a blanket prohibition on any national legislation touching slavery, as such—why, that is, they
focused their demands for prohibition on the proximate matters of the slave trade and export
taxes, rather than directly on the institution itself. One reasonable answer is that they had a
sense of what their fellow delegates would agree to.
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
122. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 605 (July 13, 1787) (statement of
Pierce Butler, as recorded by Madison); see also MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE
PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006). But see GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A
SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION: SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 103–42 (2010) (questioning this account).
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for the slave trade only until 1808, in part because it was confident that by
1808 the balance of power in the general government would be such that
Congress would not ban the slave trade then either.123 And the calculation
that decisionmaking power within the general government was much more
important to the future of slavery than anything about the texts describing
what powers Congress could exercise seems to have been borne out by
history. Slavery lasted as long as proslavery politicians maintained control
of the general government’s elected branches, but it did not last much longer.
C. “Sovereignty”
Another possible reason for wanting to limit Congress was more abstract.
Under the Constitution, states would not be sovereign in the way they had
officially been under the Articles of Confederation.124 But if not sovereign
entities, what exactly would the states be? Would anything be left of their
separate autonomy once sovereignty was compromised? Some delegates
wondered whether the state governments would become “mere
corporations”125—something like administrative departments of a national
government carrying out tasks at their subordinate station.126 Many
delegates wanted them to be more than that—to have some existence
123. Whether that was a miscalculation depends on where one ends the story. Formally,
Congress did prohibit the slave trade in 1808. As a matter of practice, the slave trade
continued, and prominently so through South Carolina, and the general government declined
to stop it. See generally W. E. BURGHARDT DUBOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE
TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1638–1870, at 89–93 (New York, Longmans,
Green & Co. 1896); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Louisiana Purchase and South
Carolina’s Reopening of the Slave Trade in 1803, 22 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 263 (2002).
124. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II (“Each state retains its
Sovereignty . . . .”).
125. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 362 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of
James Mason, as rendered by Madison).
126. On the origins of American colonies as corporations, and as exercising power under
the constraints faced by other corporations, see Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of
Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 535–55 (2006). On the idea that states under the new
Constitution might be conceived as corporations, see id. at 545–46, 546 n.241 (recounting
articulations of this idea at the Convention and also outside the Convention in 1787). Note,
however, that the idea of the states as “corporations” was slippery, and it could also point in
the opposite direction from the one described in this sentence. For example, the prominent
anti-Federalist Robert Yates, who represented New York at the Convention until he left in
disgust, charged during the ratification debates that the new Constitution would create a
general government with governmental power of every kind, rather than only a specified
subset of powers, precisely because the Constitution neglected the states in their “corporate”
capacity. Writing pseudonymously as Brutus, Yates wrote that the Constitution “will not be
a compact entered into by the states, in their corporate capacities, but an agreement of the
people of the United States, as one great body politic,” from which it followed that the power
of the government so created would “extend to every case for which any government is
instituted.” See Brutus XII, supra note 99, at 74. To distinguish this valence of the idea of
states as corporations from the one discussed in the main text, it may be useful to remember
that Convention delegates contemplating the possibility that the states would be just
administrative departments of the national government often spoke of the states in that
condition as mere corporations. The adjective signals something important. See HULSEBOSCH,
supra note 100, at 223 (describing a continuum of corporate entities, from weak to strong, and
the question of where along that continuum states would lie).
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independent of, and decisionmaking autonomy from, the general
government.127 Whether that additional measure of autonomy could in any
helpful sense be described in the language of “sovereignty” is a complex
question.128 (Which is why the heading for this section appears in scare
quotes.) But whether or not sovereignty is an analytically illuminating rubric
for considering the status of states under the Constitution, some delegates
were concerned that the proposed Constitution would make the states fully
subordinate to a national government, and they used the language of
sovereignty (and of “mere corporations”) to express that concern.129 And
according to a commonly held view, one way to guarantee states a
meaningful and not fully subordinate existence would be to provide that over
a broad swath of decisionmaking, state governments would be the sole
decisionmakers.130
From the ratification debates forward, the enumeration of congressional
powers has been presented as a means to that end. But there are at least two
important ways in which the idea of the enumeration as a means for giving
the states a status beyond that of “mere corporations” is more problematic
than generally recognized. First, the idea of enumerating congressional
powers does not seem to have figured in the Convention’s major discussions
of the status of states. When the delegates discussed ensuring that the states
would enjoy some sort of quasi-sovereign status, the proffered solutions
tended to sound in the structure of the general government rather than in the
list of projects that that government could pursue. According to
Connecticut’s William Samuel Johnson, for example, letting state
legislatures appoint one branch of Congress could preserve the states as
something like sovereign entities within the Virginia Plan’s overall scheme
of a robust national government.131 Within that way of thinking,
guaranteeing states a status greater than mere administrative arms of the
national government meant giving states seats at the table, rather than
limiting what could be decided there.
Second, there is a mismatch between the goal of guaranteeing something
like autonomy or quasi-sovereignty for the states and the description of
congressional powers that the Convention actually drafted. The sine qua non
of an enumeration of congressional powers designed to meet the state-status
concern would be that it be limiting. That means two things. First, the
enumeration of powers must not be one that would in practice allow the
127. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 362 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of
George Mason, as rendered by Madison).
128. For an excellent and thorough argument that sovereignty has ceased to be a useful
category in political thought, and indeed that it had probably ceased to be so by the time of
the founding, see generally DON HERZOG, SOVEREIGNTY R.I.P. (2020).
129. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 362 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of George
Mason, as rendered by Madison).
130. Id. at 25 (July 17, 1787) (statement of Roger Sherman, as rendered by Madison)
(proposing that Congress should not be able to interfere in matters of “internal police” within
the states).
131. 1 id. at 354–55 (June 21, 1787) (statement of William Samuel Johnson, as rendered
by Madison); id. at 362–63 (statement of William Samuel Johnson, as rendered by Yates).
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national government to make law across all, or nearly all, of the important
policy domains. Second, it must be unmistakable that Congress could
legislate only on the basis of the powers enumerated. That principle—that
Congress could exercise only a closed set of legislative authorities—would
be at least as important as any particular substantive choice about what
powers were and were not allocated to Congress.
It is not clear that the Constitution the Convention drafted answers to the
first criterion. For a long time, the enumerated powers of Congress have, in
practice, authorized legislation on pretty much any topic. The conventional
thinking today is that the founders did not see things that way, but in fact
many Americans in that generation—including both promoters and
opponents of the Constitution—read the Preamble,132 the General Welfare
Clause,133 and the Necessary and Proper Clause134 as plausibly vesting
Congress with general legislative power, or at least something close to it.135
To be sure, many of the Constitution’s supporters publicly rejected that
reading during the ratification debates. But the fact that that reading existed,
and that it was prominent rather than merely marginal, makes it problematic
to conclude that the Constitution clearly did not warrant congressional power
that broad. And with respect to the second criterion, it would have been easy
for the Framers to state clearly, in the Constitution’s text, that Congress could
legislate only the basis of the powers enumerated. They did not.136 Given
the purported importance of the principle, it is a suggestive omission.137
One might respond that the Framers did not clearly articulate the principle
that Congress was confined to its enumerated powers because they took that
principle for granted. But if so, the Framers must have been puzzlingly
obtuse. As soon as the draft Constitution was offered to the public, critics
132. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
133. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
134. Id. cl. 18.
135. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 633 (Sept. 15, 1787) (statement of
Elbridge Gerry, as rendered by Madison) (declining to sign the Constitution in part because
of “the general power of the Legislature to make what laws they may please to call necessary
and proper”); George Mason, Objections to This Constitution of Government (Sept. 15, 1787),
reprinted in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 637, 640 (Mason’s “Objections to this
Constitution of Government”) (warning that the Necessary and Proper Clause would permit
Congress to “extend their powers <power> as far as they shall think proper”); Brutus I, N.Y.J.,
Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 5, at 411, 414 (writing that the Necessary
and Proper Clause gave Congress general jurisdiction); see also 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1921
(1791) (statement of Rep. Elias Boudinot) (treating the Preamble as a broad grant of power);
id. at 1917–18 (statement of Rep. John Lawrence) (same).
136. Some say that the Constitution does indeed say that in the Vesting Clause of Article
I. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. But as I have explained at (somewhat ridiculous) length
elsewhere, that is a bad reading of the Vesting Clause, and it is virtually certain that nobody
held that view of the clause at the Convention. See generally Richard Primus, Herein of
“Herein Granted”: Why Article I’s Vesting Clause Does Not Support the Doctrine of
Enumerated Powers, 35 CONST. COMMENT. 301 (2020).
137. Given the existence of many readers who described the enumeration as limiting, the
point is not that the omission of a clear statement of the principle shows that the enumeration
of powers was not meant to be limiting. What it indicates, rather, is that the Framers as a
group were not clearly of the view that the enumeration was meant to be limiting.
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began to argue that the list of enumerated powers was not limiting, and they
could make that argument because the document did not make the contrary
principle clear.138 As Thomas Jefferson put the point in a letter to Madison,
one could say that the enumerated powers were limiting, but the document
could just as easily support the opposite inference.139 Perhaps the Framers
were not such poor readers of their own worked-over text not to anticipate
that point.
Similarly, it would be odd for the Framers to have thought that the
principle that Congress could legislate only based on its enumerated powers
would be taken for granted if they also thought that limiting Congress to a
set of enumerated powers would ensure that the states would not be “mere
corporations.”140 Anyone paying attention at the Convention would know
that several leading delegates—Alexander Hamilton,141 Wilson,142
Gouverneur Morris,143 and maybe even Madison144—might want a
Constitution that would, in practice if not by declaration, reduce the states to
the status of administrative departments of the national government.145
Surely the delegates who did not want to reduce the states to that status would
have recognized the issue as live and contested. Against that background, it
would be odd for the Convention to have thought that it could enumerate
138. See Centinel II, supra note 85, at 460 (noting that the Articles of Confederation
specified the principle expressly, so it was noteworthy and significant that the Constitution
did not); Letter from Cincinnatus I to James Wilson (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in 13 DHRC,
supra note 5, at 529, 531.
139. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 7, at 482–83 (“[T]o
say, as mr Wilson does that a bill of rights was not necessary because all is reserved in the
case of the general government which is not given, while in the particular ones all is given
which is not reserved, might do for the Audience to whom it was addressed, but is surely a
gratis dictum, opposed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as from
the omission of the clause of our present confederation which had declared that in express
terms.”).
140. See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 362 (Aug. 21, 1787) (statement of
George Mason, as rendered by Madison).
141. See 1 id. at 291 (June 18, 1787) (as rendered by Madison) (proposing a national
legislature with power “to pass all laws whatsoever”).
142. See id. at 172 (June 8, 1787) (as rendered by King).
143. See id. at 530 (July 5, 1787) (as rendered by Madison) (“State attachments, and State
importance have been the bane of this Country. We cannot annihilate [the states]; but we may
perhaps take out the teeth of the serpents.”).
144. See id. at 463 (June 29, 1787) (statement of James Madison, as rendered by Madison)
(suggesting that “too much stress was laid on the rank of the States as political societies”); see
also id. at 363–64 (June 21, 1787) (statement of James Madison, as rendered by Yates)
(suggesting that it would be acceptable for the national government to swallow up the state
governments, so long as it were done for the good of the whole). To be sure, Yates was an
unfriendly reader of nationalizing projects, and he may (or may not) have given Madison’s
words a more extreme meaning than Madison intended. But for present purposes, what
matters is whether delegates eager to preserve the states as autonomous decisionmakers would
have seen other delegates as contending for the contrary, regardless of whether that assessment
was accurate.
145. Some delegates also read other delegates as having this agenda, even if it was denied.
See, e.g., id. at 263 (June 16, 1787) (statement of John Lansing, as rendered by King)
(comparing the Virginia and New Jersey Plans and saying that the former “[w]ill absorb the
State sovereignties & leave them mere Corporations, & Electors of the natl. Senate”).
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powers, and not specify that the enumeration was limiting, and trust that
everyone would understand it that way.
D. Capacity
Another reason the delegates had for wanting to articulate limits on the
national government’s legislative jurisdiction is less intuitive to modern
Americans. Its root was a fear not of too much governance but of too little.
The United States in 1787 was an enormous country, with a growing
population spread out along more than a thousand miles of seaboard and
hundreds of miles into the interior as well. It was not realistic, many of the
Framers reasoned, for a single legislature to provide for all of the diverse
locations within such an extensive polity.146 The country needed
governmental action: commerce had to be fostered and regulated, roads and
canals had to be built, and so on. If Congress had the responsibility for all
the necessary legislation, a great deal would be left undone. No single
legislature could have the time and the information necessary for attending
to all these matters. Lacking real acquaintance with the needs of all of the
country’s far-flung localities, Congress would often fail to provide the
governance that those areas required.147
A comment at the Convention by Connecticut’s Oliver Ellsworth
exemplifies this concern. As Madison recorded the comment, Ellsworth said
that “[w]hat he wanted was domestic happiness.
The Nat[iona]l
Gov[ernmen]t could not descend to the local objects on which this
depended.”148 The rendering of Ellsworth’s comment in Robert Yates’s
notes is even more suggestive:
I want domestic happiness, as well as general security. A general
government will never grant me this, as it cannot know my wants or relieve
my distress. My state is only as one out of thirteen. Can they, the general
government, gratify my wishes? My happiness depends as much on the
existence of my state government, as a new-born infant depends upon its
mother for nourishment.149

The concern here is not with limiting the power of government, lest too much
power be a threat to liberty. The concern is with making sure that
government is sufficiently active, attentive, and supportive to supply the
146. See id. at 155 (June 7, 1787) (statement of George Mason, as rendered by Madison)
(“[W]hatever power may be necessary for the Natl. Govt. a certain portion must necessarily
be left in the States. It is impossible for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the U.S.
so as to carry equal justice to them.”); id. at 287 (June 18, 1787) (statement of Alexander
Hamilton, as rendered by Madison) (“The extent of the Country to be governed, discouraged
him.”); id. at 357 (June 21, 1787) (statement of James Madison, as rendered by Madison)
(“The great objection made ag[ain]st an abolition of the State Govts. was that the Gen[era]l
Gov[ernmen]t could not extend its care to all the minute objects which fall under the
cognizance of the local jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not ag[ain]st the probable
abuse of the general power, but ag[ain]st the imperfect use that could be made of it throughout
so great an extent of country, and over so great a variety of objects.”).
147. See, e.g., id. at 357–58 (statement of Madison, as rendered by Madison).
148. Id. at 492 (June 30, 1787) (statement of Oliver Ellsworth, as rendered by Madison).
149. Id. at 502 (statement of Ellsworth, as rendered by Yates).
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conditions for a flourishing life. The language of “nourishment” and the
analogy to an infant depending on its mother could hardly be more
powerful150 on this point. The threat to be addressed is the possibility that
government will do too little.
To a modern constitutional lawyer, this concern does not call for limiting
the powers of Congress. Modern Americans know that what Congress leaves
undone can be done by state and local governments. The modern government
operates, as a general matter, with a theory of concurrent jurisdiction,
meaning that in most areas of domestic policy the state legislatures and
Congress are simultaneously competent to regulate. Federal regulation
prevails in case of conflict, but in the absence of federal law, states can act
as they like. So if Congress fails to attend to some important economic need
particular to people in Connecticut, Connecticut can take appropriate
measures by itself. But in 1787, many of the Framers either did not grasp or
else actively were skeptical of concurrent jurisdiction. According to a
commonly held view, Congress and the state legislatures needed to regulate
separate and nonoverlapping policy domains.151 Within that framework,
assigning domains of legislation to Congress meant preempting state
legislation in those domains. And on that understanding, giving Congress
more responsibility than it could handle was dangerous, because it meant that
whatever Congress failed to do would simply go undone.
Modern Americans often neglect this aspect of the Framers’ worldview.
Working from the premise that the primary role of the Constitution is to limit
governmental action, many intuitively think that the point of confining
Congress’s powers to certain domains is to prevent Congress from
overregulating. But the Framers were not primarily worried about
congressional overregulation.
They were more worried about
underregulation; the government they knew was too weak, not too strong,
and their project was to enable government to do more, not less. And they
needed to be careful, lest their design of a more powerful national
government inadvertently compound the underregulation problem by
stripping local officials of the authority they would need to govern all the
areas of life that Congress, as a practical matter, would not be able to manage.
To the extent that the Framers envisioned only one government being
responsible for any given policy domain, they needed to avoid assigning too
many domains to Congress—not for fear that Congress would regulate too
much but for fear that Congress would regulate too little and that the states
would be legally barred from picking up the slack. Enumerating specific
150. Or more gendered. The “Mommy State” has deeper roots than many of its detractors
recognize.
151. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 14, at 34–35 (May 30, 1787) (statement
of Roger Sherman, as rendered by Madison); id. at 53 (May 31, 1787) (statement of Charles
Pinckney, as rendered by Madison) (reflecting the view that power given to Congress
necessarily withdraws power from states). See generally ALISON L. LACROIX, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010) (emphasizing the importance, in
American thought up until the time of the Convention, of the idea that different legislatures
had jurisdiction over different subject matters).
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domains of congressional legislation might have seemed like a way to
address this problem.
If measured by this purpose, the Convention’s choice to enumerate specific
powers of Congress should be classified as a success. For more or less the
Constitution’s first century, the laws whose constitutionality the judiciary
measured by reference to Article I, Section 8 were usually not federal laws.
The laws whose constitutionality were at issue on federalism grounds were
usually state laws, and the question was whether the relevant state had
legislated in an area of congressional jurisdiction—most commonly under
the Commerce Clause152—and therefore, on the separate-spheres model, an
area in which state law was preempted even if congressional power lay
dormant.153 By construing the Commerce Clause narrowly, nineteenthcentury courts preserved the ability of state governments to regulate the
social world at a time when Congress lacked the will and the resources to do
so in any comprehensive way.
But note some dynamic features of the enumeration, understood this way.
First, this approach to Congress’s enumerated powers would make it logical
for courts to give congressional legislation a strong presumption of
constitutionality. The problem to be solved, after all, is not that Congress
might regulate things it should not. It is that Congress might fail to regulate
in areas where it is the only authorized regulator. So where Congress has in
fact regulated, thus obviating the risk that nobody will regulate, the courts
can sustain Congress’s regulation—provided only that the judges can
articulate a construction of congressional power on which what Congress has
done is different from most of what the states are doing, thus avoiding the
conclusion that a lot of state regulation comes within one of Congress’s
domains and is therefore invalid. (Such constructions might include, “This
federal law is a regulation of commerce among the states, so it is unlike, and
does not preempt, state laws that merely exercise the police power.” Or,
“This federal law regulates commerce directly, so it is unlike, and does not
preempt, state laws that regulate commerce but only indirectly.”)
So consider what might happen over time if Americans became more
interested in having an active national legislature and congressional capacity
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
153. See, e.g., Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877);
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99 (1876); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867); Smith
v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 408–10 (1849) (plurality opinion);
Thurlow v. Massachusetts (License Cases), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 582–83 (1847), overruled
in part by Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890); Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 102, 143 (1837); Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251–52
(1829); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445–49 (1827); see also Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (“For nearly a century . . . decisions of this Court under the
Commerce Clause dealt rarely with questions of what Congress might do in the exercise of its
granted power under the Clause, and almost entirely with the permissibility of state activity
which it was claimed discriminated against or burdened interstate commerce. During this
period there was perhaps little occasion for the affirmative exercise of the commerce power,
and the influence of the Clause on American life and law was a negative one, resulting almost
wholly from its operation as a restraint upon the powers of the states.”).
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increased. As Congress gradually pushed its legislation into more and more
areas, judicial willingness to sustain the things that Congress did would yield
a significantly expanded sense of what Congress’s enumerated powers
include. As judicial legitimations of federal laws multiplied, it would
become harder and harder to articulate plausible categorical distinctions
between the purported sphere of Congress and that of the states, thus putting
pressure on the idea that Congress and the states occupy separate regulatory
spheres. That pressure could be relieved by adjusting to the idea of
concurrent jurisdiction: why exactly, we now say, can Congress and the
states not regulate in the same domains? And once we adjust to the idea of
concurrent jurisdiction, preserving the states’ capacity to regulate where
needed would no longer require courts to articulate Congress’s legislative
jurisdiction as if it occupied only specific slices of the social world. All of
which is pretty much what happened.154
All told, it is possible to see the Convention’s enumeration of
congressional powers as an attempt—indeed, a sensible attempt—to address
the problem of potential underregulation, in a world where Congress would
have limited capacity and concurrent jurisdiction was not yet well accepted.
And to the extent that this way of thinking captures the point of enumerating
Congress’s powers, the enumeration was a solution to a problem that
American law no longer has. No wonder it does not do much work.
CONCLUSION
Few constitutional theorists, whether originalists or otherwise, contend
that the intentions of the Framers determine the correct answers to modern
questions of constitutional law. But the correct answers to questions of
constitutional history often depend on the ideas of the Framers, because the
content of the Framers’ ideas is precisely what some of those questions are
about. Our interest in understanding the Convention is not exhausted by our
interest in modern law.
Moreover, it would misunderstand American constitutional culture to
think that decisions about modern constitutional law are entirely independent
of modern decisionmakers’ intuitions about the ideas of the Framers, even
when those decisionmakers do not consciously believe that the Framers’
intentions are a source of constitutional authority. It is hard, and rare, for
modern decisionmakers to think, “Here is the right answer, and it flies in the
face of the judgment of the Philadelphia Convention.”155 In other words,
intuitions about the story of the Convention frame many modern
constitutional analyses, even absent a claim that anything about the
Convention is authoritative. Nomos and narrative maintain some rough
correspondence. So until we accept a better understanding of the

154. For one good telling of this story, see Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:
United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125.
155. Cf. Richard Primus, Is Theocracy Our Politics?, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 44
(2016) (describing this feature of the psychology of constitutional decisionmaking).
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Convention, the present one, with its flaws, will do work in constitutional
law.

